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the optimal level of direct hedging relative to cash sales in the face of uncertain prices are: f = price of futures at harvest; p = and yields. Minimum risk hedging levels harvest spot price; d = harvest basis, d = p (hedging levels which minimize the variance -f; and y = yield. Finally, X/2 represents of returns) when prices and yields are un-the producer's risk parameter (X/2 > 0); certain have been derived by both McKinnon E( ); V( ); and C( ) are the expected value, and Heifner. Heifner's model is the more the variance, and the covariance of parengeneral since it also allows for basis risksthetical terms, respectively. the uncertainty concerning the relationship With forward contracting, the producer's between cash and futures prices when hedges objective function is: are lifted. Using Midwestern soybean data,
(1) = BG+E(p(y-B))-X/2[V(py) Heifner's estimated minimum risk hedges ranged from 57 percent of the expected crop + B2V(p)--2BC(py,p)], in Iowa to only 22 percent of the expected where B quantity forward contracted. With Indiana crop. Rolfo derived optimal hedging B a the hie variable, the optimal level levels a g tB as the choice variable, the optimal level levels assuming that producers maximize ex-of forward contracting from the first order of forward contracting from the first order pected utility of income within a mean-var-condition for maximization of equation (1) iance framework, or alternatively, that i: producers' utility functions are logarithmic. Using cocoa data, Rolfo found that yield and C(py,p G-E(p). basis uncertainty reduce the ratio of the op-(2) B V) GX(p) timal hedge to expected output to well below unity and may result in establishment of long For comparative purposes, the optimal level futures positions. These studies treated the of futures holdings with direct hedging in production decision as exogenous in that the the face of price, yield, and basis uncertainty choice of input levels was made prior to the is given by: hedging decision. the effects of forward pricing on the level of In the following, Rolfo's mean-variance returns. This component is inversely related model is modified to allow for "fixed" price to the producer's risk parameter and disapforward cash contracting in the face of price, pears if the producer is infinitely risk averse; basis, and yield uncertainty. An individual i.e., the producer seeks only to minimize the risk-averse producer maximizes utility of in-variance of returns. come from predetermined input levels by In equation (3), the numerator of the specthe optimal choice of forward contracting ulative term is the difference between futures level within a mean-variance framework.' In price prior to harvest and the expected level the way of notation, the upper case is used of futures price at harvest time or the exto denote variables always known with cer-pected return from holding futures. This term tainty. These are G = forward cash contract disappears if futures are unbiased; otherwise, price; F = price of harvest futures prior to it may be positive or negative according to harvest; and D = basis offered on forward the level of perceived futures bias. For forcash contracts; i.e., D = G -F. Lower case ward contracting (equation (2) ), the nuvariables are uncertain by assumption. These merator of the speculative component lAs pointed out by Rolfo, implicit in the use of the mean-variance model is the restrictive assumption that the producer has either constant absolute risk aversion or that his utility function is quadratic and risk aversion increases with wealth. The mean-variance model has, however, been widely employed to determine optimal forward pricing levels (Kahl) .
represents the difference between the for-EMPIRICAL MODELS ward contract price and the spot price expected at harvest. This numerator may be In this section, optimal forward contractpositive, zero, or negative according to both ing levels for soybeans subject to price, basis, the level of perceived futures bias and the and yield uncertainty are estimated for ten level of D relative to E(d). The denominators Coastal Plain counties in South Carolina for of the speculative components of equations each year from 1975 to 1984.
3 For compar-(2) and (3) include the variances of spot ative purposes, concurrent optimal direct prices and futures, respectively. Note that hedging levels are also estimated. The prebasis uncertainty affects the speculative com-harvest decision dates for each forward pricponent for forward contracting, but not for ing alternative are those nearest April 15 for direct hedging. The relative magnitude of which forward contract basis data for Charles-V(f) versus V(p) depends upon the extent ton, South Carolina, are available. Forward of basis variability and the covariance be-contracting and spot deliveries are assumed tween harvest time futures and basis. Yield made at Charleston on dates nearest Novemvariability does not affect the speculative ber 1 for which Charleston cash prices are components of these equations.
reported
The hedging components of these equaFollowing Rolfo's approach, expectational tions are directly related to the covariances ra r tan istoricdaa areused tomeasure between returns from spot marketings and rather than historic data are used to measure between returns from spot marketings and harvest time prices, which, in turn, depend price and yield uncertainty under both foron the extent to which the producer's output ward pricing alternatives. Futures price foreis correlated with aggregate output and the cast error, f, is given by (f -F)/F where f elasticity of demand. Although the denomi-is the price of November futures at the harnators of these components contain harvest vest time delivery and F is the price of Notime price variances, there is not necessarily vember futures at the decision date. Cash an inverse relationship between these vari-price forecast error, p, is given by (p -)/ ances and minimum risk forward pricing lev-p where p is the Charleston cash price at els as the numerators are not independent of harvest time delivery and p is the expected these variances. The hedging components are Charleston harvest time cash price measured independent of forward price as neither the by November futures at the decision date preharvest futures nor the forward contract plus the expected harvest time basis.
4 Yield price appears therein.
forecast error, y, is given by (y -y)/y where The relative magnitudes of optimal direct y is realized yield and is forecasted yield hedging and forward contracting cannot be as of the decision date. Revenue forecast determined a priori except under restrictive eor fom cash ae thus jf + c + error from cash marketings is thus -+ -+ assumptions as to the distributions of yields o c ^ and prices. If yields, futures, and the basis Also f = F(1 + f), = (l + ), and at harvest are stochastically independent P( P) (Bohrnstedt and Goldberger) , the hedging Optimal forward contracting and direct components of both equations reduce to E(y) hedging levels expressed as proportions of and the demoninator of the speculative com-forecasted yield are: ponent for equation (2) that of forward contracting regardless of per-P P ceived futures bias.
XypV(p) 2An intuitive explanation for the result that E(y) is the risk minimizing forward pricing level under stochastic independence is offered by McKinnon (p. 849) . Under stochastic independence, short crops are just as likely to be associated with low harvest prices as high harvest prices. Purchases in the cash market to meet forward commitments would not increase the variance of the producer's returns. Forward sales of E(y) allow the producer to protect himself against price variability without worsening the influence of yield uncertainty on the variance of his returns. and Table 1 are the mean covariances (and as-
and yield forecast errors across the ten couny FV(f) XFV(f) ties. Note that these covariances are positive respectively. Equations (4) and (5) are es-prior to 1978. From 1978 onward, the covtimated for each of the ten South Carolina ariances between cash price and yield forecounties for each year between 1975 and cast errors have larger absolute values than 1984. For each of those years, the variances, the corresponding covariances between fucovariances, and expected values involving tures price and yield forecast errors. f, p, and y are calculated from the ten imEquations (4) and (5) are estimated for mediately preceding observations on those each of the ten counties from 1975-84 for X variables. Datasourcesareasfollows:yields---0.01,0.10, 1.0, 10, 100, and oo, with South Carolina Crop Reporting Service; fu-averages across the counties reported in Table  tures prices-Wall Street Journal Charles-2. 7 Optimal forward contracting levels laton cash prices-Department of Agricultural beled CONTRACTA are derived usingestiEconomics and Rural Sociology, Clemson mated levels of E(P). Contracting levels University, and The State; and Charleston labeled CONTRACTB are derived under the forward prices-Department of Agricultural assumption that E(p) = 0 (preharvest futures Economics and Rural Sociology, Clemson and basis estimates are unbiased). Optimal University.
hedging levels, labeled HEDGE, are derived Displayed in Table 1 are the cash, futures, using sample estimates of E(f). Note, howand basis determinants of the optimal forward ever, that optimal hedging levels with unpricing levels for 1975-84. With the excep-biased futures (i.e., E(f) = 0) are identical tion of 1975-6, the variances of forecast er-to HEDGE levels for X = oo since the nurors for spot pri ces exceed those of futures merator of the speculative component of prices. Variances of forecast errors for both equation (5) Table 2 , note that optimal contracting uniformly positive; however, these means are and hedging levels are relatively insensitive not significantly different from zero at the 5 to changes in % between one and oo; i.e., the percent level. There are no trends apparent speculative components of optimal forward in either mean over the sampling interval, pricing levels are inconsequential for these but mean cash price forecast errors exceed values of X. Also for values of X > 1, there those for futures after 1977. With the ex-are downward trends over time in all of the ception of 1977-8, forward contract basis forward pricing alternative levels due to inoffers are less than or equal to the expected creases in the variances of forecast errors for harvest time basis in Charleston.
cash and futures prices and the absence of Covariances between cash marketing rev-corresponding trends in the covariances of enue and price forecasting error and yield cash marketing revenue and price forecast forecasts are calculated for each of the ten errors. After 1976, optimal hedging levels counties for 1975-84. Owing to space lim-generally exceed optimal contracting levels itations, only the means across the ten coun-for these X values. This follows from the ties and associated mean standard errors are larger values of V(p) relative to V(f) after shown in Table 1 . As can be seen from com-that year. Optimal forward contracting and parison of these means to their corresponding hedging levels greater than unity indicate that standard errors, differences in these measures risk averse producers would have incentives across counties are small. While there is a to forward price quantities in excess of exclose correspondence between the co-pected production. For X > 1, optimal forvariance terms from equations (4) and (5) ward pricing levels greater than unity are for any year, the covariance term from equa-encountered from 1975-7. On these occation (4) is never greater than the correspond-sions, the sample covariances between price ing term from equation (5). Also shown in and yield forecast errors are positive. CAROLINA SOYBEANS, 1975 -1984 Year Determinant" 1975 Determinant" 1976 Determinant" 1977 Determinant" 1978 Determinant" 1979 Determinant" 1980 Determinant" 1981 Determinant" 1982 Determinant" 1983 Determinant" 1984 V(- 0.59 *CONTRACTA = optimal forward contracting level using estimated E(P). CONTRACTB = optimal forward contracting level assuming E(P) = 0. HEDGE = optimal hedging level using estimated E(f).
Changes in X below unity result in dramatic producers' risk preferences. These results reductions in optimal forward pricing levels suggest that rule of thumb recommendations for CONTRACTA and HEDGE. When X = 0.01, such as forward price one-half to two-thirds the speculative components of these forward of expected yields may be inappropriate for pricing alternatives overshadow their corre-some producers. Extension efforts should fosponding hedging components, resulting in cus on educating producers as to how indinegative optimal values. That is, producers vidual circumstances affect optimal forward would have incentive to be long in futures pricing ratios. under HEDGE or to offer forward contracts
The results presented here indicate that under the CONTRACTA alternative. For 1978-the absence of basis risk with forward con-9, when D > E(d), reductions in X below tracting does not explain producer preferunity increase optimal levels of CONTRACTB. ence for forward contracting over direct In all other years, levels of CONTRACTB are hedging as a forward pricing tool. An obvious reduced by reductions in X, although not to explanation follows from the naivete of the the extent to which CONTRACTA and HEDGE mean-variance model employed. Whether are reduced.
these results hold for alternative utility func-SUMMARY ATIND CONCLUSIONS tions deserves further research; however, re-SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS cent evidence indicates that the meanRolfo's mean-variance model is extended variance model performs well when comto accommodate forward contracting (which pared to direct utility maximization (Kroll is not subject to basis risk) as an alternative et al.). to direct hedging (which is subject to that
The present analysis has ignored differrisk) with applications to soybean data. ences in margin requirements between direct Counter to intuition, both theoretical and hedging and forward contracting. Nelson has empirical analyses indicate that the absence argued that the costs associated with margin of basis risks with forward contracting does accounts required with direct hedging are not necessarily lead to higher levels of for-likely to be trivial in most cases. However, ward contracting relative to direct hedging access to credit may differ according to for producers who are infinitely risk averse. whether crops are hedged directly or forward Infinitely risk averse producers would have contracted (Barry and Willmann; Harris and incentive to forward contract or hedge quan-Baker). tities smaller (larger) than their expected
The research presented here could be exoutput if yields and harvest time prices are tended in several ways. South Carolina is not negatively (positively) correlated. Another a major soybean producer, thus the current surprising result is that although the vari-empirical results may not be applicable to ances of harvest time price forecast errors major producing regions such as the Midwest have steadily increased from 1957 to 1984, and the Delta. There is a need to extend the risk minimizing forward contracting and analysis to other producing regions. The hedging levels have decreased over the same analysis could be expanded to accommodate interval. Although optimal forward contract-alternative forward pricing tools; e.g., oping and hedging ratios are relatively insen-tions. Kenyon has argued that yield uncersitive to changes in the risk aversion tainty is less of a problem with options than coefficient above unity, these ratios are sen-with hedging. Finally, the analysis could be sitive to changes in that coefficient below expanded to incorporate the effects of govunity. Thus, optimal forward pricing ratios ernment price-support programs on harvest are variable with respect both to time and time price variability.
